Anglo American PLC

Last edited by Phil Mattera on May 15, 2010 - 11:00am

Company Snapshot:

Anglo American is one of the world’s largest mining companies, with operations in some 45 countries. The company had its origins in the gold and diamond mines of apartheid South Africa, and after the Second World War it expanded and diversified to the point that it controlled large portions of that country’s economy. It later sold off its non-mining businesses, moved its headquarters to London, and spun off its gold mining operations into the company now called AngloGold Ashanti. Anglo American remains a major player in platinum, copper, coal and diamonds (through its affiliate De Beers). It has been embroiled in environmental and human rights controversies in a variety of countries. In June 2009 Anglo rebuffed a proposal from rival mining group Xstrata that the two join in a merger of equals.

Profile editor:

Phil Mattera

Ownership status:

Publicly traded

Number of employees worldwide:

190,000

Chief executive officer:

Cynthia Carroll

Website:

http://www.angloamerican.co.uk

Global Fortune 500 rank:

336

Tel:

+44-20-7968-8888

Net Income:

US$7 billion

Total revenue:

US$30 billion

Corporate accountability

Accountability overview:

For decades, Anglo American was known as the company that got rich from exploiting oppressed black miners within the apartheid economy of South Africa. It has worked hard to change that image, though it still has tense relations with mineworkers (especially over safety issues) in its South African operations. The company has also been at the center of controversy over environmental or human rights issues in countries such as Ghana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Peru (see below).

Labor:

During the decades that Anglo American dominated gold mining in apartheid South Africa, the company’s relations with its largely black workforce were often contentious. In 1983 Anglo and other gold mining companies agreed for the first time to negotiate a contract with the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM, representing black miners), but four years later Anglo crushed an NUM strike by firing 40,000 workers.

The NUM frequently criticized Anglo’s record on health and safety. In 1988 the union estimated that 46,000 workers had been killed in South Africa’s gold mines since the beginning of the century. That same year, seven workers died from lethal fumes caused by the burning of polyurethane foam during a fire at an Anglo American mine. An industry committee had recommended the removal of the foam from all mines after a similar fire in 1986 caused the deaths of 177 workers at a mine owned by another company.

In 1995, 104 workers at an Anglo American gold mine were killed when the cable controlling an underground train snapped and the train plunged down a shaft onto an elevator transporting miners. At a memorial service for the victims, an NUM official blamed racism for the disaster: “If a black man’s life was not considered cheap this could not have happened.”

In July 1999, 19 miners perished in a methane gas explosion at the Mponeng mine. In November 1999 a worker doing maintenance at AngloGold’s Ergo processing facility died after inhaling cyanide gas. In the following years the deaths kept happening—often several at a time. Sometimes they were due to mechanical problems, other times they were linked to earth tremors, especially at the Savuka and TauTona mines near Carletonville.

Anglo’s platinum operations have also had contentious labor relations—both before and after the end of white rule. Legal and illegal strikes have taken place virtually every year, and management has often responded aggressively. Anglo’s Leplats subsidiary, for instance, fired 1,200 workers after a wildcat strike in 1990. The remaining miners engaged in a six-day underground sit-in. Anglo sacked its entire workforce of 28,000 after a wildcat work stoppage in 1996 and then began evicting the workers from their hostels. At least five workers were later killed in violent clashes with police.

While wages were most often at the center of the labor disputes, a 2002 walkout at Rustenburg’s base metal refinery was prompted by workers’ dissatisfaction with changes in their medical coverage. A 2007 strike was a response to the increasing use of casual and contract labor.

Labor-management tensions have also been intensified by what unions argue is an unacceptably high rate of accidents and fatalities at Angloplat’s mines, including 18 deaths in 2006 and 24 deaths in each of the previous two years. The issue boiled over in 2007 after five workers were killed in accidents at the company’s platinum mines over a period of two weeks. Responding to public pressure, the company suspended those operations for seven days, though it was unclear whether the shutdown did anything to improve safety conditions. The furor over workplace deaths also appeared to be a key reason for the unexpected resignation last year of Angloplat chief executive Ralph Havenstein.

By late 2007, the NUM was fed up with the number of workplace accidents and deaths at Angloplat, AngloGold and other mining companies. In December the union staged a one-day national strike to protest unsafe working conditions. “The bosses are concerned only about huge bonuses while poor workers are getting killed in the process,” said NUM general secretary Frans Baleni. “These accidents are reaching alarming proportions.” Annual deaths at Anglo American facilities have ranged between 40 and 50 in each of the past few years.

Environment and product safety:

The operations of Anglo American and those of its spinoff AngloGold have been associated with environment problems in numerous countries. Here are some examples:

Platinum mining in South Africa
Anglo Platinum, a subsidiary of Anglo American known informally as Angloplat, is the world’s leading producer of platinum, most of which is used in automobile catalytic converters and as jewelry. The company has long had a problem with the volume of sulfur dioxide its smelters emit into the air. At a 2003 public meeting in Rustenburg, company officials admitted that emissions levels had been on the rise and the result was “not a pretty picture of what is being done to the environment.” Angloplat was putting about 150 tons of SO2 into the atmosphere each day, while its competitor Impala Platinum had cut its emissions to a much lower level. Angloplat brought its emissions down in 2004 and 2005, but they jumped 8 percent in 2006 and 13 percent in 2007. A 2004 thesis written by Sunette Steyn at the University of Pretoria concluded that, despite some improvements made by the platinum industry in Rustenburg to control particulate pollution, problems remained. Among the reasons cited were slow commissioning of new technology and the fact that smelter management “does not take environmental management seriously enough and often the policies set by top management (head office) and not enforced at ground level.”

Zinc mining in Ireland
Anglo American’s Lisheen mine, located amid an agricultural region in northern County Tipperary, was associated with water quality problems in the Drish River and the Rossestown River, both tributaries of the River Suir, according to reports of the Environmental Protection Agency Ireland. In April 2006 EPA Ireland issued a press release saying that an analysis of sediment in the Drish and Rossestown Rivers found “unsatisfactorily high levels of metals, including lead and zinc.” The agency advised farmers to prevent farm animals from having direct access to the affected stretches of the river. The advisory was later lifted. Anglo sold the operation in 2010.

Zinc mining in South Africa
A scientific study published in the journal Environmental Research found that children living near Anglo American’s Black Mountain zinc mine in South Africa had elevated levels of lead in their blood compared to children in a comparison town about 40 km away and compared to what would be expected in a rural setting. The study found that blood lead levels averaged around 16 μg/dL, with 98 percent of the sample having lead levels equal to or greater than 10 μg/dL, the threshold level for adverse health effects established by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control. The study also reported: “Overall, children with raised blood lead levels performed less well at school relative to other children.” Anglo sold this operation in 2010.

Copper and gold mining in Alaska
In August 2007 Anglo American announced that it had agreed to partner with Northern Dynasty Partnership in the development of the controversial Pebble cooper and gold mine project in southwest Alaska by Bristol Bay, the headwaters of the world’s largest wild sockeye salmon fishery. Concerned about the possible impact of the project on salmon production and the overall environment, local groups such as the Renewable Resources Coalition and Nunamta Aulukestai (Caretakers of the Land) have been campaigning against it. Their campaign website is Eye on Pebble Mine.

Planned copper mine in Peru
Quellaveco, a large copper mining project in southern Peru that Anglo has been developing for more than 15 years, has been strongly criticized by environmental groups. Friends of the Earth International (FoEI) has warned that local agriculture and cattle raising in the highly arid area could be seriously harmed by the enormous amount of water the mine would require. FoEI’s critique was based on an independent environmental impact assessment conducted by Robert Moran titled The Quellaveco Mine: Free Water for Mining in Peru’s Driest Desert? Moran took issue with the company environmental impact assessment claim there would be no significant impacts. Instead, he concluded that the project “is likely to have numerous long-term, negative impacts on water quality and quantity in the operational and waste disposal areas, but most importantly, will assuredly aggravate the already contentious competition for water in one of the driest irrigated regions of the world.”

Human rights:

Anglo American and its spinoff AngloGold have been in bitter conflict with subsistence communities and farmers in countries such as Ghana and South Africa, where villagers have been displaced from their traditional lands to make way for mining operations.

Ghana
In Ghana, Anglo has complained that the environmental problems experienced at mines such as Obuasi are the fault of reckless behavior by illegal galamsey miners. Yet many of these galamseys are former farmers who were forced off their land by expanding mining activity. An October 2006 ActionAid International report on conditions at Obuasi estimated that 60-70 percent of galamseys were in that category. Critics such as ActionAid have accused AngloGold of human rights violations against the galamseys, but the company has vigorously denied the charges. Yet there is no doubt that tensions between AngloGold and the galamseys have continued to escalate.

A controversy over displacement also exists at another major Ghanaian gold mine, Iduapriem, which was developed in the 1990s by Australia’s Golden Shamrock Mines with financing help from the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation. In 1996 Ashanti took over Golden Shamrock and thus its interest in Iduapriem. Anglo obtained a controlling interest in 2004 when it purchased Ashanti.

An April 2007 article in the Ghanaian publication Public Agenda reported on interviews with farmers cultivating land near the Iduapriem mine who said they had been prevented by AngloGold security guards from accessing their land, with “almost all the footpaths and other routes…farmers…had been using since time immemorial to get to their farms…rendered impassable by mounting heaps of waste rock dumped all over their community over the years by the AngloGold Ashanti mine.” Other farmers have lost their land entirely. Despite receiving modest cash compensation, they are angry that they have not been given new land to cultivate, as was promised in the 2003 Resettlement Action Plan agreed to by Ashanti. Five years later, with AngloGold now in charge, that commitment has still not been fulfilled.

South Africa
In South Africa, Anglo Platinum has been embroiled in a controversy over its relocation of 10,000 people from the Ga-Puka and Ga-Sekhaolelo villages in Limpopo province to allow for an expansion of the company’s Potgietersrust Platinum operation. Although the company promised to pay for new homes for the villagers, it faced lawsuits and protests over the plan, including one in which a group of women faced down company bulldozers. At a June 2006 protest over the arrival of Angloplat drilling teams, police opened fire with rubber bullets as well as some conventional ammunition, causing more than two dozen injuries. The Limpopo controversy flared up again in March 2008 when a BBC Radio feature and a new ActionAid report both provided more details on the dislocations. For example, ActionAid quoted residents of the village of Ga-Pila who refused to relocate but soon found themselves without water, electricity and other basic services. The report quotes one villager as saying that a mine official “told us they were cutting the electricity to force us out. He very clearly told us that” (p.17). The company put the blame on local officials. Anglo American put out a press release and a 44-page document denying that residents had been forced off the land, defending the level of compensation provided and insisting that it in no way directed police to use force against demonstrators.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
In October 2002 the United Nations Security Council published a report (Document S/2002/1146; no longer on the UN website) criticizing the role that private interests, including mining companies such as AngloGold, had played in exploiting the DRC’s resources amid the confusion of civil war in the 1990s. Anglo was among the firms accused of violating OECD ethical guidelines for multinationals. Like many other companies, Anglo strongly objected to being included in the report, issuing a statement insisting that it was “confident that, at all times, our minimal involvement in the DRC has been fully compliant with international legal norms.” In October 2003 the UN Security Council, chastened by the uproar, published a revised version of the report that in effect apologized for including the list of alleged violators of OECD guidelines.

AngloGold may have thought that its DRC public relations problems were over, but in June 2005 Human Rights Watch published a report titled The Curse of Gold charging that AngloGold was very much in violation of OECD guidelines because of actions taken in relation to gold mining rights it acquired as part of the merger with Ashanti. The report accused the company of violating a UN arms embargo by making payments to a brutual militia group. Noting that AngloGold purported to be committed to corporate social responsibility, Human Rights Watch insisted that the company “should have ensured their operations complied with those commitments and did not adversely affect human rights. They do not appear to have done so. Business considerations came above respect for human rights” (p.2).

AngloGold admitted making the payments to the militia group but vowed it would not do so again. It then carried out a review of its operation in DRC to “determine whether this activity could be conducted with integrity.” Not surprisingly, the company concluded it could do so, adding: “It is our belief and hope that our presence contributes to an improvement in the economic prospects for the Democratic Republic of Congo and, thereby, reinforces the peace process.”

De Beers
De Beers, which took control of the diamond mining industry in South Africa in the late 19th Century, was itself taken over by Anglo American and the Oppenheimer interests in 1929. De Beers came to dominate the global diamond trade through an entity called the Central Selling Organization that rigidly controlled supplies of the gems—sometimes by force. In 1990 De Beers was divided into two parts—a South African-based operation focused on procuring mined diamonds and De Beers Centenary AG, based in Switzerland, which oversaw worldwide sales. De Beers and Anglo American were both publicly traded, but each in effect controlled each other through cross-holdings, with the Oppenheimers ultimately in charge.

It was not until the late 1990s that De Beers’ control of the diamond market began to appear vulnerable. Companies such as Rio Tinto and BHP staked positions in big new diamond finds in Canada, and producing countries such as Australia and Russia became more significant players. Longstanding antitrust cases—including an action by the U.S. Department of Justice alleging price-fixing of industrial diamonds—were pending against De Beers in the United States, making it impossible for directors of the company to visit America.

De Beers was also contending with criticism over its alleged involvement in the trading of diamonds mined amid bloody conflicts in Africa. During the early 1990s there were reports in publications such as Newsweek (March 15, 1993) and the London Guardian (March 4, 1993) suggesting that De Beers was buying diamonds from the violent rebel group UNITA, which had been waging a bloody war against the government of Angola for most of the previous two decades.

The issue came to a head in late 1998, when the human rights group Global Witness published a report about the role of illegal diamond sales in financing the Angolan civil war. The report documented the extensive involvement of De Beers in Angolan diamond production and argued that the opaque trading system created by De Beers made it possible for gems from renegade groups such as UNITA to enter the market.

Initially, De Beers simply denied doing business with UNITA. This did not quell the controversy. Global Witness challenged De Beers to develop “a more accountable way of operating which tightens controls on ‘outside’ goods from conflict zones.” Questions were also raised about the role of diamonds in financing rebel groups in other countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia. The whole industry was under a cloud.

One way the Oppenheimer interests responded to the situation was with structural changes to De Beers. In July 2000, it was announced that the company would no longer act as a monopoly for the world diamond supply and would instead focus on boosting global demand for the gems, including those from its own mines which were to be sold for the first time under the De Beers brand. Then, in 2001, De Beers was taken private, with the Oppenheimers and Anglo American each holding 45 percent. The remaining 10 percent was put in the hands of Debswana, a mining venture co-owned by De Beers and the government a Botswana, a major source of diamonds. (The Botswana government share was later increased to 15 percent.)

De Beers also decided to go from being on the defensive about its diamond sourcing to taking the lead in the campaign to address the conflict diamond issue. In October 1999 De Beers announced it would stop buying new diamonds from Angola. The following year, the company surprised even its critics by pledging that it would not trade in conflict diamond from any source and that it would back that promise with written guarantees. Global Witness welcomed the move as a “major first step,” but it asked for clarification on how the pledge would be audited and whether De Beers could “give an absolute guarantee that it will never again buy such conflict goods from rebel areas.”

Skeptics, meanwhile, pointed out that the suppression of conflict diamonds served the interests of De Beers by restricting global supply and thereby raising the value of its purportedly untainted gems. In a front page story, the New York Times marveled: “Turning necessity into a virtue with the same skill it has used for decades to promote diamonds as glittery icons of love and beauty, it recast and began promoting itself as the squeaky-clean crusader.”

There was also speculation that De Beers’ newfound ethical position might earn it a settlement of its U.S. antitrust problems. (That occurred in 2004, when De Beers paid the maximum fine of $10 million to resolve the criminal charges.)

While De Beers was looking for ways to benefit from the effort to abolish conflict diamonds, human rights groups kept pushing for deeper reforms. That began to happen in May 2000, when representatives of the diamond industry and diamond-producing countries met in Kimberley, South Africa with key non-profit organizations. With support from the United Nations, this initiative resulted in the creation in 2002 of the Kimberley Process, a joint government, industry and civil society effort to curb the flow of conflict diamonds through a certification system.

Human rights groups have supported the Kimberley Process, but they point out it cannot work effectively until the diamond industry lives up to promises about self-regulation it adopted in 2002. A November 2006 report by Global Witness points out that the industry has still not created an auditable tracking system, has not done enough to monitor suppliers to be sure they are not evading Kimberley certification, and has not improved the transparency of its internal regulatory procedures.

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History

Anglo American’s origins go back to South Africa in the 1860s, when a diamond deposit was discovered near Hopetown. Soon the area known as Kimberley was the leading diamond-mining location in the world. By the mid-1880s the industry was dominated by large operators, particularly De Beers Diamond Mining Co. In 1888 De Beers, led by Cecil Rhodes, took over a major rival, Kimberley Co., and changed the name of the combined firm to De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd., which by the beginning of the new century had total control over the Kimberley mines.

Meanwhile, gold mining was also on the rise, thanks to the discovery of large deposits in the Witwatersrand ridge near Johannesburg. Several leading diamond magnates, including Rhodes, moved into gold. In 1887 they registered in London a firm called Gold Fields of South Africa Ltd., which assumed the kind of control over gold production that De Beers had over diamonds. By the mid-1910s, however, the fastest growing part of the gold business was found not in the main Witwatersrand area but in a newly developed peripheral section known as the Far East Rand. The major company in the area was Consolidated Mines Selection Co., which was founded in 1897 and had come under the control of diamond trading firm A. Dunkelsbuhler & Co. in 1905.

The key figure in the Dunkelsbuhler firm was Ernest Oppenheimer, a cousin of the company's founder (Anton Dunkelsbuhler) who had gone to South Africa in 1902 to run the firm's Kimberley office. In 1917 Oppenheimer decided to establish a new company to exploit the gold potential of the Far East Rand. The plan was to base the firm in Johannesburg and raise capital in New York (from the likes of J.P. Morgan & Co.) rather than London. Oppenheimer, apparently trying to disguise his German origins, wanted to call the firm African American Corporation, but his backers persuaded him to change it to Anglo American Corporation of South Africa. In both cases, the use of the term American was misleading.

With Oppenheimer as chairman, Anglo American began taking over various gold operations and then moved into diamond mining in Namibia, merging 11 mining companies into Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa. In 1922 Anglo formally took over Consolidated Mines Selection Co. and moved into diamond production in Angola and the Congo. From that position Anglo challenged De Beers for leadership of the diamond industry and in 1927 made a hostile takeover offer for that company. Despite the resistance of De Beers, Anglo finally achieved that goal in 1929.

The diamond market plunged during the Depression, but the gold side of Anglo's business charged ahead, spurred by rising prices for the metal and by rapidly improving productivity in the mines. As the Second World War ended, Anglo was in a commanding position in both gold and diamond mining. It had also become a major producer of uranium, coal and copper.

Anglo's influence was not limited to mining. Through its takeovers and investments it gradually developed a portfolio of interests in various industrial sectors, including steel, explosives, fertilizers, chemicals and banking.

During the 1960s, amid a general economic boom in the country, there was a dramatic acceleration of Anglo's industrial diversification. The group, then headed by Ernest Oppenheimer's son Harry, formed Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corp. Other major investments were made in paper production, newspaper publishing, construction and textiles. In addition, Rand Mines, which had come under Anglo's control in the early 1960s, merged with Thos. Barlow and Sons in 1971 to form the huge Barlow Rand mining-industrial group. Barlow was the third largest industrial company in South Africa, with activities ranging from the manufacture of electrical equipment and railway cars to the marketing of heavy equipment, steel, timber and motor vehicles.

Anglo's intricate web of holdings was not limited to southern Africa. During the 1970s Anglo used companies such as Minerals & Resources Corp. (later known as Minorco) to spread its tentacles to Europe, North America, South America and Australasia. Avoiding the Anglo American name helped downplay the connection to apartheid South Africa, whose companies were increasingly being ostracized.

Minorco, which focused on the Americas, had by the beginning of the 1980s become one of the largest foreign investors in the United States. Through its holdings in the commodities trading company Phibro Corp. it ended up with a close tie to one of the leading American investment banking firms, Salomon Brothers, which Phibro acquired in 1981. Minorco also had significant holdings in the U.S. mining company Engelhard Corp. and in the British firm Consolidated Gold Fields, which in turn was the largest shareholder in Newmont Mining, a leading U.S. copper and gold producer.

During the late 1980s, as the pressure for divestment prompted many foreign companies to sell their South African subsidiaries, Anglo bought a number of these operations. The Oppenheimers had resisted the worst features of apartheid, and company head Gavin Relly met with the African National Congress while it was still in exile. This helped the company avoid a government takeover and retain its dominant economic position after the establishment of black majority rule.

Anglo had not depended entirely on good relations with the ANC. In 1990, Anglo’s De Beers diamond cartel split itself in two and based all its non-South African operations in Switzerland under the name De Beers Centenary. In a $1.4 billion stock and asset swap in 1993, Minorco took over all the non-diamond operations of both Anglo and De Beers outside South Africa. Anglo also spun off some of its South African financial holdings to black investors.

Then, in 1998, Anglo American merged completely with Minorco and announced that it would move its headquarters to London, switch its primary listing to the London stock exchange, and change its name to Anglo American PLC. To make itself more comprehensible to investors, the company simplified its structure by selling, combining or dissolving many of its subsidiaries.

As part of that process, Anglo combined its various gold operations (including those held by Minorco) into an entity called AngloGold. In 2004 AngloGold acquired Ghana’s Ashanti Goldfields Company Limited to form AngloGold Ashanti. Since 2006 Anglo American has been reducing its holdings in AngloGold. In 2007 it accounting for AngloGold as an associated company rather than a subsidiary, and in 2008 it began to treat its interest as simply a financial investment.

In 2001 the Oppenheimers announced plans to end De Beers’ status as a publicly traded company, turning it into a private firm in which the Oppenheimers and Anglo American would each own 45 percent. The remaining 10 percent would be in the hands of Debswana, a mining venture co-owned by De Beers and the government a Botswana, a major source of diamonds. As a result of the deal, the Oppenheimers’ holdings in Anglo American fell to less than five percent. In a 2006 move illustrating the dramatic changes at Anglo American, the company chose an American woman, Cynthia Carroll, to be its chief executive.

In June 2009 rival mining group Xstrata proposed that Anglo join it in a merger of equals, but Anglo's board quickly rebuffed the offer.

In May 2010 Anglo sold its zinc operations to Vedanta Resources.

Financial information

Stock ticker symbol:

London Stock Exchange: AAL

Fiscal year:

2007

Fiscal year:

2007

Major lines of business/segments:

Anglo American operates in six main businesses:

Platinum. The company’s 76.5 percent-owned subsidiary Anglo Platinum Limited (located in South Africa) is described as “the world’s largest primary producer of platinum, accounting for around 40% of the world’s newly mined platinum output.” Anglo has five platinum mining operations that are wholly or majority owned as well as three smelters, a base metals refinery and a precious metals refinery, all of which are located in the Limpopo and North West provinces of South Africa. In addition, Anglo has a 50-50 joint venture with a historically disadvantaged South African (HDSA) consortium, led by African Rainbow Minerals, for the Modikwa platinum mine; a joint venture with Royal Bafokeng Resources (a HDSA partner) for the combined Bafokeng-Rasimone platinum mine and Styldrift properties; and a joint venture with Xstrata for the Mototolo mine. In September 2007, Anglo Platinum announced transactions that would result in the transfer of 51 percent of Lebowa Platinum to HDSA interests.

Base Metals. This segment primarily involves copper, nickel and mineral sands. Anglo Base Metals has interests in 18 operations in six countries, nearly all in southern Africa and South America (Brazil, Chile, Peru and Venezuela). Anglo sold off its zinc operations in 2010.

Diamonds. Anglo American owns 45 percent of De Beers, the world's leading diamond business. Another 40 percent is held by Central Holdings Limited, an entity controlled by the Oppenheimer family. The government of Botswana controls the remaining 15 percent. With its joint venture partners, De Beers operates in more than 20 countries across five continents, employing around 20,000 people. From its 19 operations across Botswana, Canada, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania, De Beers produces approximately 40% of the world’s rough diamonds by value.

Ferrous Metals and Industries. Anglo Ferrous Metals is a leading producer of iron ore, manganese and carbon steel. It is operates primarily through a 63.4 percent shareholding in Kumba Iron Ore in South Africa, an 81.3 percent interest in the Minas-Rio project in Brazil and a 70 percent stake in the Amapá mine in Brazil. Ferrous Metals also has interests in manganese ore and alloy operations and carbon steel products. The sector also includes Scaw Metals – a steel producer with operations in southern Africa, Chile, Peru, Canada and Mexico – as well as a 40 percent stake in Samancor Manganese and a 38 percent interest in Hulett Aluminium

Coal. Anglo Coal claims to be the world’s sixth largest private sector coal producer and exporter, with operations in South Africa, Australia, South America and Canada. In South Africa it owns and operates eight mines and has a 50% interest in Mafube mine. Anglo Coal is the fourth largest producer of coal in Australia, with one wholly owned mine and a controlling interest in another four. In South America, Anglo Coal has a 33 percent shareholding in Cerrejón Coal and produces thermal coal for export to Europe and the Americas. It also has a 25 percent interest in Carbones del Guasare (CDG) which owns and operates the Paso Diablo mine in northern Venezuela. In North America Anglo Coal has a 66 percent interest in Peace River Coal, which has one operating metallurgical coal mine and significant coal resources in western Canada. Anglo Coal also has a 60 percent interest in the Xiwan coal mine lease area in China, where the feasibility of developing the mine is under evaluation in conjunction with Anglo Coal’s joint venture partners, the Shaanxi Coal Geological Bureau.

Industrial Minerals. Anglo Industrial Minerals’ (AIM) sole business is Tarmac, an international heavy building materials producer. In the UK it is a market leader in aggregates, asphalt, mortar and ready-mixed concrete, with significant operations in concrete products, lime and cement. It has operations in continental Europe and the Middle East producing crushed rock, sand and gravel, asphalt, ready-mixed concrete and concrete products. In August 2007, Anglo American announced it would sell Tarmac but has not yet gone through with the sale.

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