Citigroup

Last edited by on June 17, 2009 - 11:03pm
Company Snapshot: 

Citigroup, operating as Citi, is a major financial services company based in New York City. The company is the most dramatic example of how banking deregulation both succeeded and failed. Formed by the 1998 merger of Citicorp and Travelers Group, at its peak the company employed over 332,000 people around the world and held over 200 million customer accounts in more than 100 countries.

Citi suffered massive losses after the subprime mortgage securities bust, turning to outside sources such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and the government of Singapore for a $20 billion capital infusion. In the fall of 2008, it was forced to accept two bailout payments from the U.S. federal government. Nevertheless, rumors of insolvency and possible nationalization continue to haunt the company. Its stock plunged to below $2 in mid-February, 2009. (It lost nearly 85 percent of its value in 2008).

In January 2009 Citi announced that it would split into two entities.

Citi also played a part in other financial scandals of the early 2000s, including Enron and WorldCom.

Number of employees worldwide: 
327,000
Chief executive officer: 
Vikram S. Pandit
2008 Global Fortune 500 rank: 
17
Net Income: 
$79 million
Total revenue: 
159,600,000,000
CrocTail subsidiary information
Embedded CrocTail tool for interactively exploring information on company subsidiaries parsed from SEC filings. More information...
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Corporate accountability
Accountability overview: 

NASD Fines:

On June 6, 2007, NASD announced that it had fined Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. $3 million to settle charges relating to the use of misleading materials in retirement seminars and meetings for BellSouth employees in North Carolina and South Carolina. NASD also ordered Citigroup to pay approximately $12.2 million in restitution to more than 200 former BellSouth employees.

  • In 2004, NASD censured and fined Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. $275,000 for a series of violations related to its sales of two proprietary managed futures funds - Citigroup Diversified Futures Fund L.P. and Salomon Smith Barney Diversified 2000 Futures Fund L.P. NASD said Citigroup's violations included: Making unsuitable recommendations of the fund to 45 customers, failing to maintain required records of sales, failing to adequately disclose the risks of investing in managed futures.
  • In March, 2005, NASD fined Citigroup, American Express and Chase $21 Million for improper sales of Class B and C shares. The firms were fined for failing to consider or adequately disclose to their customers that an equal investment in Class A shares would generally have been more economically advantageous for their customers by providing a higher overall rate of return. The charges and settlement involved over 275,000 transactions and 50,000 households.
Tax issues: 

The parking scandal of the 1970s

Between 1973 and 1980, Citibank shifted about $58 million in profits from high-tax to no-tax jurisdictions through phony foreign exchange trades and loans. These foreign exchange operations were known as "parking."

Exchange law controls aim to prevent excessive "shorting" of currencies. To short a stock or a currency is to sell it when you don’t have it. If a trader thinks the Swiss franc is going down, he will sell it. He doesn't have to have it to sell it. Governments believe that by shorting their currency, traders are able to drive down its value. Therefore, many countries establish limits for how large a position in their currency a bank could have. To avoid the limit, Citibank traders put their "positions" offshore.

"Parking" was also used to launder profits. On any day, if there was a range of prices, a Citibank trader could do two offsetting trades where he lost money and a tax haven branch made a profit. Back-to-back loans – loaning money to a branch and borrowing it back at higher interest – had a similar effect.

The parking branches were Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt, Zurich, London, Milan, Paris, Toronto, Tokyo, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Saudi Arabia and Mexico. They parked foreign exchange positions in the offshore tax havens Nassau, Panama, the Channel Islands, Monaco, and Bahrain.

Paperwork made it seem as if Citibank parking branches were losing money and the no-tax offshore centers were making all the profits.

Citibank management knew that this procedure was illegal. A Citibank internal auditor testified to the SEC: “It is very simple to do real transactions just for the purpose of transferring profits…They can be done at realistic rates by selecting [buy and sell price] quotes at different times during the day, making them almost impossible for an outsider to discover.”

In 1977, a whistleblower in Citi's Paris office told his bosses about the scam and the next year, when they had still taken no corrective action, he told the top corporate officials and then informed the SEC. Citibank fired him. The bank then attempted to disguise the trades by hiding them in numerous small transactions, using code worda, listing phony prices on the books, making phone orders with no records, and falsifying audits.

The 1981 SEC report said, “The practices and procedures of such parking were done pursuant to policies laid down by senior management in New York.” It said also that, “The facts show clearly that all levels of management (except the outside Board members) knew of the questionable conduct…and senior management approved it.”

The SEC report noted that “the transactions engaged in by Citibank have all the attributes of evasion of the law, not avoidance.” And that “elaborate efforts were made to disguise” the transactions, and the books didn’t reflect the nature of the transactions. The report then concluded “it is clear that Citibank systematically and knowingly violated exchange control, tax or other laws of virtually all of the countries involved.”

Money Laundering in Chile

In October 2004, Chile's tax authorities filed a lawsuit for tax evasion against former military dictator Augusto Pinochet. One of his tax-evasion money-laundering banks was Citibank, which hid and laundered at least $5 million and perhaps millions more, according to the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

Citigroup ran accounts for Pinochet from 1981, when he was still dictator after the 1973 U.S. - supported coup, until 1996. It ran offshore accounts connected to the Pinochets until 2005, a total of at least 63 U.S. accounts and certificates of deposit for Pinochet and his family. The U.S. Senate report said, “Pinochet used the Citigroup accounts to move funds within the United States and across international lines, transact business, and construct an international web of secret accounts.”

In June 2002, a U.S. bank regulator asked Citigroup whether their Private Bank had accounts for Pinochet or his wife, including accounts under a listed disguised names. The head of Citigroup’s global anti-money laundering group said that an earlier global search had turned up no Pinochet accounts at the bank. Of course, there were dozens.

Laundering Money for Salinas, Bongo, the Abachas

Citigroup's Private Bank accepts only very wealthy clients – with $5 million minimum and generally more than $10 million in deposits. It has about 25,000 "special clients." Its services include setting up off-shore accounts and arranging financial transactions for them to evade taxes.

U.S. Senator Carl Levin, at a hearing of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in 1999, said that the Private Bank of Citibank has had “a rogue’s gallery of private bank clients.”

Clients included Raúl Salinas, the brother of the former President of Mexico; Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of the former Prime Minister of Pakistan; Omar Bongo, the dictator of Gabon, three sons of General Sani Abacha, the late military dictator of Nigeria; Jaime Lusinchi, the former President of Venezuela; two daughters of Radon Suharto, the former dictator of Indonesia; and General Albert Stroessner, the former dictator of Paraguay.

Levin said, "And these are just the clients we know."

The same system Citibank used for them – offshore shell companies and secret accounts – is the system it uses for thousands of other Private Bank clients who have something to hide.

Amy Elliott, Salinas's private banker, told the U.S. Senate subcommittee about the operation she set up for him. She called it "a very standard account structure in the international private banking industry, including Citibank."

She set up a personal investment company, or PIC, to hold Salinas's investments, with the shares of that corporation owned by a secret trust. She said, "Such an account structure provides for confidentiality and also allows for efficient tax and estate planning." She said that Salinas’s desire to transfer money out of Mexico was “exactly what many other wealthy Mexicans, including my clients, were doing at the time.” She said it was a structure that at least 70 percent of Citibank's Mexican clients and most of its Latin American clients use. She said, "It was a standard structure within the International Private Bank.”

She used classic tax-evading, money-laundering techniques: secret shell companies and accounts, a trust known only by a number, layering – one anonymous company owning another company that owns another company -- and concentration or correspondent accounts that blur the identities of depositors. Citibank helped Salinas move $100 million from Mexico to Switzerland and London through shell companies and networked accounts.

Elliott said that the bank's vice chairman, William Rhodes, knew all about it.

The Argentine Offshore Bank Scam of The 1990s

In 2001, Argentina defaulted on its national bonds. The economic crisis that followed brought hardship to the majority of Argentinians, especially to workers, women and the poor. Critics said the economic crisis was provoked by massive evasion of taxes and capital flight. That year, the program "Día D" of America TV in Buenos Aires sent an actor to catch Citibank promoting tax evasion.

The actor, who secretly video-taped the encounter, told the Citibanker that he had just sold a company and didn’t want to report all the profits. The Citibanker told how he could help him evade taxes.

He would send the money via a wire in another name to a transit account at Citibank New York and then move it to an International Personal Banking account. As a nonresident foreigner, the client wouldn't pay taxes. The Citibanker said, "You are not going to have problems with taxes." Argentine authorities wouldn't know about his account. He said, "Eighty-five percent of my clients do this operation. Eight-five percent of clients of the private bank have an offshore portfolio. They manage all the money abroad. Why? Because they are fed up with paying [taxes]."

After the program was broadcast, the Citibanker was fired and the bank moved its private bank accounts to Chile and Uruguay.

Moving Russian Money Offshore In The 1990s

Deryck Maughan, CEO of Citigroup International, told a news conference in 2003 that, "Russia is a large opportunity for the group." Citibank would run clients’ portfolios and for Russians who deposited more than $25,000, it would open Citibank offshore investment accounts.

It wasn't the first time Citibank had helped Russians move their money offshore. A few years earlier, in 2000, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that throughout the 1990s Citigroup allowed more than $800 million in suspicious Russian funds to flow through 136 U.S. accounts tied to shell companies registered in Delaware. The corporations were set up by a Russian immigrant who then opened Citibank accounts for them. Over 70 percent of the Citibank deposits for these accounts was quickly wire-transferred abroad, mostly to tax havens. Investigators believed it was money fleeing taxes or the profits of crime.

Offshore Subsidiaries

The Tax Justice Network's report on Citigroup includes a list of 185 offshore subsidiaries listed in Citigroup’s annual SEC filing. The corporation’s past behavior raises questions about its continued use of the offshore secrecy system.

Isle of Jersey Subsidiaries

Examining offshore operations today, Tax Justice Network examined the Jersey network of 11 companies. The existence of these companies is not “hidden” or “secret,” but the ownership structure, indicated in the chart in our report, is curious. TJN asked Citigroup questions about the network and asked to discuss this report before publication with Citigroup officials, but the senior official who deals with civil society declined to respond.

Environment and product safety: 

On March 27, 2008, Citi joined CERES, the investor network on climate change, nearly a year after Citi announced a $50 billion investment commitment over the next 10 years to address global climate change. The bank's investments would support the commercialization and growth of alternative energy and clean technology among the clients and markets it serves, as well as within its own businesses and operations.

The move comes after years of pressure and targeted campaigning against the bank's investment in destructive projects, led by groups such as the Rainforest Action Network. which continues to push Citi to stop funding coal-fired power plants.

On June 18, 2008, Citigroup's Investment Research Group (Smith Barney) published a report examining 111 companies destined to benefit from the threat of climate change (up from 74 companies in 2007).

Political influence (national and international): 

Ties to the Obama Administration

Richard D. Parsons, the new chair of Citigroup (as of 1/09), was a member of President Obama's transition economic advisory board. According to the NYTimes, Parsons declined a request by incumbent Mayer Michael Bloomberg to consider running as his successor.

The Obama administration also includes numerous acolytes of former Citi executive and Clinton administration Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, including Timothy Geithner, Lawrence Summers (chair of the National Economic Council), and Peter Orszag (budget director). Many of the ties were made through the Hamilton Project, for which Rubin was a driving force.

Geithner and Citi

On April 27, 2009, the NYTimes reported that Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner "was particularly close to executives of Citigroup, the largest bank under his supervision. Robert E. Rubin, a senior Citi executive and a former Treasury secretary, was Mr. Geithner’s mentor from his years in the Clinton administration, and the two kept in close touch in New York. ... But for all his ties to Citi, Mr. Geithner repeatedly missed or overlooked signs that the bank — along with the rest of the financial system — was falling apart. When he did spot trouble, analysts say, his responses were too measured, or too late."

When Geithner arrived at the NY Fed, Citi's then-CEO Simon Weill was a member of the NY Fed's board. "Mr. Geithner met frequently with Sanford I. Weill, one of Citi’s largest individual shareholders and its former chairman, serving on the board of a charity [National Academy Foundation], Mr. Weill led. As the bank was entering a financial tailspin, Mr. Weill approached Mr. Geithner about taking over as Citi’s chief executive."

"Throughout the spring and summer of 2007, Geithner met repeatedly with members of Citigroup’s management, records show...From mid-May to mid-June alone, he met over breakfast with Charles O. Prince, the company’s chief executive at the time, traveled to Citigroup headquarters in Midtown Manhattan to meet with Lewis B. Kaden, the company’s vice chairman, and had coffee with Thomas G. Maheras, who ran some of the bank’s biggest trading operations."

"While waiting for a breakfast meeting with Mr. Weill at the Four Seasons Hotel in Manhattan, Mr. Geithner phoned Mr. Dugan, the comptroller of the currency, according to both men’s calendars. Both Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase were pushing for the new standards."

According to the Times, Weill even offered Geithner the chance to succeed him as CEO after he left, but Geithner turned the offer down. (Jo Becker and Gretchen Morgenson, "Geithner, Member and Overseer of Finance Club," NYTimes, 4/27/09).

Deregulation and the Enron Scandal

In the 1990s, the venerable old Glass-Steagall Act came under sustained attack by Citi and other big financial interests who promised great efficiencies would come from the kinds of consolidation that the law specifically prohibited. By 1997, the Act had been weakened enough to allow banks to acquire securities firms outright. By 1999, thanks to a lobbying effort led by Citibank and others, Glass-Steagall was essentially history. At long last, investment banking, insurance, and financial underwriting were back under the same umbrella again. The final compromise on the legislation, it is worth noting, was brokered by then treasury secretary Robert Rubin, who joined Citi as a vice-president just four days later. (Rubin resigned from Citi in early January 2009, after playing a "pivotal role in the bank's current woes" (Eric Dash and Julie Criswell, "Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made Bolder Bets," NYTimes, 11/23/2008). At the time of the legislation, Citigroup had already merged with Travelers/American Express, in violation of Glass-Steagall.

With the law’s repeal, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup, Citicorp’s successor, were free to both lend money and underwrite securities for Enron, WorldCom and others. Citigroup, for instance, was paid a total of $167 million by Enron for various services from 1997 to 2001. Citigroup and J.P. Morgan Chase repeatedly issued huge loans to Enron that were disguised as energy trades (which then enabled Enron to misstate the loan proceeds as cash flow from business operations, misleading investors, analysts, tax collectors, and employees who lost their life savings and jobs). At the same time, the big banks were also pivotal players – perhaps the architects – of the offshore special purpose entities that were used to hide the company’s debt and which ultimately brought the company down . (In addition, bank executives personally invested in the lucrative partnerships.) As Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) testified in one of the many congressional investigations of Enron, this one leading to a major investigative report on "The Role of the Financial Institutions in Enron's Collapse" (click here for volume 1; and volume 2): “Citigroup and Chase…not only assisted Enron, they developed the deceptive pre-pays as a financial product and sold it to other companies as so-called balance sheet-friendly financing, earning millions of fees for themselves in the process.” Meanwhile, even though these banks knew just how shaky Enron’s finances really were, they happily pushed investors to buy more Enron stock through their brokerage arms. Certainly, they issued no warnings, not even to credit agencies.

Enron wasn’t the only bum stock that the big Wall Street firms were pushing for all the wrong reasons. With investment banking and brokerage services now under the same roof as commercial banking, investment advisers had begun taking their cues from bosses who were more concerned with pleasing big corporate clients than with giving good advice to the small investor. As a result, advisers recommended that their clients buy stocks in companies that they privately derided as “crap” and “junk” for the sole reason that these companies were investment banking clients at their firm. These massive conflicts of interest resulted in an epidemic of worthless “buy” ratings. According to Weiss Ratings, an independent analyst whose revenues do not come from the companies they analyze, the vast majority of Wall Street investment analysts (many tied to the same banks that underwrote the companies they were covering) advised investors to “buy” or “hold” shares in Enron and other failing companies even as they were filing for Chapter 11. Forty-seven of the 50 large brokerage firms covering companies that went bankrupt in the first four months of 2002 continued to recommend that investors buy or hold shares in the companies even as they were filing for Chapter 11. The impact of the analyst-underwriter conflicts spilled over to other activities as well. For example, Citigroups’s telecom analyst Jack Grubman (who ultimately resigned in disgrace and paid a $15 million fine) helped raise money for Qwest, Global Crossing, and WorldCom, helping them plot strategy and attending board meetings while he was touting their stock to unsuspecting investors.

Though New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer exposed these kinds of conflicts of interest at 10 major Wall Street banks (Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse First Boston, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan Chase, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, DeutschBank, UBS Paine Webber, and Piper Jaffray), the punishment did not fit the crime. The $1.4 billion fine that regulators and banks agreed to in April 2003 was a slap on the wrist for these financial giants, barely a day’s revenue for most of them. And the settlement did nothing to address the structural conflicts of interest that resulted from deregulation, even though Spitzer himself had concluded that, "I don't think there is any question that bringing many elements of financial services together has created more complex relationships that need to be properly controlled. Many of the conflicts that we are trying to unravel ... come from the notion that the concentration of financial services would be a good and healthy thing for the economy." Or as Tom Schlesinger, executive director of the Financial Markets Center explained it, “The rationale for repealing Glass-Steagall was that it would create more diversified banks and therefore more stability. What I see in these mega-banks is not diversification but more concentration of risk, which puts the taxpayers on the hook.”

2008 Bailout Details

After a series of emergency meetings, the U.S. government announced on 11/23/2008 that it had entered into an emergency agreement with Citigroup to provide a package of guarantees, liquidity access and capital. (Also see the Term Sheet). The firm has been [http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/23citi.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print "brought to its knees" by more than $65 billion in losses, write-downs for troubled assets and charges for future losses. (Additional analysis of the Citi bailout was published by Economists View, Robert Reich, Paul Krugman, and Andrew Samwick).

US Treasury and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) agreed to back $306 billion of residential and commercial loans and securities on Citigroup's balance sheet. In exchange, Citigroup agreed to issue preferred shares to the Treasury and FDIC. Treasury also agreed to invest $20 billion in Citigroup from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in exchange for preferred stock with an 8% dividend to the Treasury. The day before the announced agreement the company's stock was trading at $3.77 -- a price that represents a total loss of $244 billion in value in just two years.

Citigroup also agreed to comply with executive compensation restrictions, and the FDIC's mortgage modification program. Citi simultaneously announced that it would cut 52,000 jobs.

Bloomberg reported on January 14, 2009 that Citi had a tangible common equity of 2.41 percent of tangible assets -- "too low for investors' liking." The government has not only pumped $45 billion into the bank through the purchase of preferred stock, but has agreed to absorb a portion of losses on as much as $306 billion of assets held by Citi. Bloomberg added that "analysts at Bernstein Research...forecast that net charge-offs at U.S. banks might peak at 2.7 percent in the first half of 2010, well above an estimated 1.66 percent for the 2008 fourth quarter." (David Reilly, "Citigroup Crisis is Emblem of Capital Drought," Bloomberg, 1/14/09).

How Rubin-esque Risk-Taking Led Citi Astray

Citi's management -- including former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin (who the Times described as the "architect of the bank's strategy"), Citi CEO Charles O. Prince III (who resigned on Nov. 4, 2007), and Thomas Maheras (head of the bank's trading division) -- has been blamed for making bolder bets while its problems were increasingly obvious. As the New York Times suggested, the crisis at Citi was "years in the making," and should have been obvious to those at the top. Lynn Turner, former SEC chief accountant, added that the bank's balkanized culture and pell-mell management made the problems "inevitable."

Insiders have also described a lax internal culture in which risk managers responsible for putting the brakes on risky trading were close personal friends with those responsible for expanding the bank's mortgage-based securities portfolio.

Despite two federal bailout packages, Citi announced plans to spit itself up, "Taking Apart the Financial Supermarket" that it had built through a series of mergers and acquistions. (Eric Dash, "Citigroup Plans to Spit Itself Up," NYTimes 1/14/09). The announced plan to sell the firm's Smith Barney brokerage to Morgan Stanley, was reportedly an attempt to mitigate billions of dollars of new losses expected to come, but some analysts said they didn't think it would be enough to cover the bank's capital needs. Federal regulators, including Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation chairwoman Sheila C. Bair, have warned the company after the $27 billion second cash infusion that any further requests for assistance would result in a breakup of its operations. The second government lifeline (after the $25 billion injection in 10/08) triggered its status as operating under "open-bank assistance", which involves a loss-sharing arrangement devised by the FDIC and an investment by the Treasury "typically reserved for deeply troubled institutions." (Dash, NYT, 1/14/09). According to the NYT, investors have complained that Citi CEO Vikram Pandit did not move quickly enough to get ahead of federal regulators, who have pushed the bank to replace several directors and rethink its strategy since the fall of 2008.

History

Citigroup is the result of the 1998 megamerger of banking giant Citicorp and insurance/brokerage giant Travelers Corp.

Citicorp had its origins in the early 19th Century in the period after the demise of the First Bank of the United States. A group led by Samuel Osgood, the nation’s first postmaster general, took over the New York City branch of the First Bank and reorganized it as the City Bank of New York in 1812. Although City Bank was designed mainly as a kind of credit union for its merchant-owners, it began doing considerable business with the federal government.

In the following decades, City Bank passed through several sets of owners, and after the Civil War it switched from a state to a national charter. It was not until the 1890s that the bank, which had taken the name National City Bank, became a major financial force, thanks to the close ties it developed with the Rockefellers and their Standard Oil empire.

By the early years of the 20th Century, National City Bank was very much a financial institution for big business. It had set up a foreign exchange department and had built a network of correspondent banks overseas to help in providing foreign trade financing for its customers. It also served as the leading depository of federal government funds.

After becoming the country’s largest single bank, National City used an affiliate to buy up shares in other banks around the country and become the largest bank holding company as well. This brought about an uproar over the creation of a "money trust," which prompted National City to reduce its domestic holdings, but not its foreign bank interests.

The creation of the Federal Reserve System reduced the dominance of National City over the country's banking system, but it freed the bank to enter new lines of business. It solicited corporate customers from around the country, moved further into investment banking, and began to build an international branch network, aided by the acquisition of a majority interest in the International Banking Corp. in 1915.

During the 1920s, National City’s growth was aided by changes in federal banking law, culminating in the McFadden Act of 1927, which allowed national banks to open new branches in their home town. By the end of 1929, National City had opened 37 branches in New York City, while its trust business was strengthened by a merger with Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.

The stock market collapse and the ensuing Depression halted the expansion of National City's financial supermarket. The bank had to write off tens of millions of dollars in loans, and its securities business all but evaporated. National City was weak, but other banks were weaker. One of these was the Bank of America. In 1931 National City purchased Bank of America's 32 branches in New York, ending up with the largest retail network in the city.

National City won praise for the Bank of America takeover, but it was soon at the receiving end of criticism over its banking practices. Congressional hearings were held, during which National City president Charles Mitchell was grilled by Senators who sought to paint the bank’s wheeling and dealing in the 1920s as a primary cause of the Crash.

The bank reforms passed during the Roosevelt Administration forced National City to liquidate its securities operation, but federal deposit insurance and other protective measures restored public confidence in the whole banking system.

Yet the major expansion of the foreign as well as domestic operations of the bank did not come until after the end of the Second World War. National City took full advantage of the new position of the United States as the pre-eminent capitalist power in the world and the dollar as the dominant currency. During the 1950s it participated in the credit boom and built up its asset base by merging with a smaller New York rival called First National Bank. The combined institution took the name First National City Bank (FNCB).

When a shortage of deposits emerged in the late 1950s, FNCB moved into the growing Eurodollar market and introduced innovative financial instruments such as the negotiable certificate of deposit. It also greatly expanded what was already the largest foreign branch system of any U.S. bank. The Overseas Division was at the time led by Walter Wriston, who would later rise to the top of the bank's executive hierarchy. Between 1960 and 1967 the bank opened some 85 new foreign branches, located everywhere from Paraguay to Singapore. Wriston was determined to make the bank indispensable to U.S. companies that were themselves branching out across the globe.

FNCB was just as active developing domestic business. It expanded its New York City branch network, led the commercial banks into the residential mortgage business, and cautiously moved into the new field of credit cards. Wriston, who rose to the presidency in 1967, took advantage of a loophole in federal law to create a one-bank holding company, which could enter new businesses and not be subject to the same body of regulations as a bank.

Once a number of banks began to take this step, Congress moved to restrict the loophole, but Wriston managed to enter fields such as equipment leasing, data processing services, mortgage banking, travel services and financial counseling. This was part of his grand plan to make FNCB into a global financial services company. Wriston emerged as a leading advocate of greater freedom for banks.

During the 1970s he was also a proponent of another controversial cause. In the wake of the sharp rises in oil prices, banks like FNCB found themselves awash with deposits from oil-producing countries. Wriston led the way in recycling these petrodollars by aggressively lending to third world countries. When concerns began to be raised about the ability of these nations to repay the debt, Wriston argued that there was nothing to worry about, since countries, unlike corporations and individuals, could not go bankrupt. Maybe so, but Wriston's bank latter felt the consequences of the spread of problem loans in the third world.

At home Citicorp (the new name adopted by FNCB's holding company in 1974) weathered the financial instability brought on by failures of such companies as Penn Central and Franklin National Bank. Citibank was doing so well compared with the rest of the industry that, according to Fortune, some officials as the Federal Reserve were referring to the bank as "Fat City."

During the early 1980s Citicorp was able to pursue its expansionary goals when regulators began to permit out-of-state commercial banks to take over ailing savings and loan associations. In 1982 Citicorp, the first bank to exploit this new policy, entered the lucrative California market by taking over Fidelity Savings of San Francisco.

Wriston's successor as the leading crusader for financial deregulation and head of Citi was was John Reed, who took over upon Wriston's retirement in 1984. The Federal Reserve rebuffed Citicorp's attempt to enter the insurance business, but Reed pushed the legal limits on commercial bank involvement in investment banking, and he got into the financial information business by taking over Quotron Systems. Citicorp, which purchased Diners Club and Carte Blanche and was one of the most aggressive issuers of Visa and MasterCard credit cards, became the leader of the "plastic" banking industry.

By 1990 Citicorp was facing a rising level of non-performing assets both at home and abroad. Reed responded to the resulting pressure by cutting the company's dividend, eliminating thousands of jobs and slashing expenses. He found a new backer: Saudi Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal, who invested $590 million in Citicorp in 1991 through the purchase of special convertible preferred stock. A few weeks later Citicorp sold another $600 million in preferred stock to a group of several dozen institutional investors.

These infusions of capital provided some stability, but Citicorp's once lofty position at the top of the U.S. banking industry continued to weaken. Mergers among its domestic rivals (such as Chemical Bank and Manufacturers Hanover Trust in New York) created more formidable rivals. On the international stage, Japanese and European banks grew larger than Citicorp in size; by 1990 it was no longer among the world's top 20 bank holding companies. A further embarrassment came in August 1991, when a leading member of Congress described Citicorp as "technically insolvent."

The merger with Travelers Group was seen by Citicorp as a way out of its difficulties, as well as a way to restore its dominance in the industry. Travelers chairman, Sanford Weill, had pieced together a financial powerhouse from brokerage houses Smith Barney and Shearson, the Travelers insurance business and later investment bank Salomon Brothers. After the merger it was clear that Weill was in charge, and Reed was left with no choice but to retire.

In 2000 Citigroup got into the subprime lending business with the acquisition of Associates First Capital, and the next year it bought New York-based European American Bank. This was followed by the purchase of Golden State Bancorp, parent of one of the country’s largest thrifts, which greatly increased Citi’s presence in California. The latter deal was financed in part from the spinoff of Traveler’s property/casualty business.

The past five or six years have been a difficult time for Citigroup. It became embroiled in the Enron and WorldCom scandals and was one of the Wall Street firms whose analysts were accused of giving favorable stock ratings to companies in order to lure their investment banking business. More recently, the company has had to write off billions of subprime mortgage-related securities and had to get $20 billion in capital infusions from sources such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority to shore up its balance sheet.

Other Information: 

After announcing a staggering fourth-quarter (2007) loss of $9.83 billion, Citi continued to go hat-in-hand to foreign and domestic investors for an infusion of cash. The company's record loss was caused by write-downs from soured mortgage-backed securities and reserves for current and future bad credit card, auto and home loans totaling $23.2 billion. Gary L. Crittenden, the company's chief financial officer, "acknowledged the bank's losses appeared to be accelerating month after month."

Foreign Backers

Citigroup raised $7.5 billion from the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority on November 26, 2007.

On January 15, 2008, the bank announced it had obtained a total of $12.5 billion from the Government of Singapore; the Kuwait Investment Authority; Capital Research and Management; ex-CEO Sanford Weill; the New jersey Division of Investment; and Prince Alwaleed bin Talal.

Financial information
Stock ticker symbol: 
C
Fiscal year: 
2007
Fiscal year: 
2007
Additional descriptive data
Geographic breakdown of revenues (sales and profits), assets, employees: 

In 2006 the company reported that its revenues broke down as follows: U.S.: 56% Asia: 15% Mexico: 10% EMEA: 13% Latin America: 4% Japan: 2%

Specialized Information
Major units/subsidiaries/affiliates: 

To understand how Citi is organized, go here and here

Summary data on executive compensation and director compensation: 

According to the AFLCIO's Executive Paywatch, CEO Vikram Pandit "raked in $38,237,437 in total compensation" in 2008.

On March 7, 2008, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform examined pay practices at Citigroup and other banks. (transcript).