Ford Motor

Last edited by Phil Mattera on June 26, 2010 - 1:00pm
Company Snapshot: 

Ford, one of the great names of the auto industry, has played a major role in shaping both the horizons of everyday life and the conditions of toil on the job. Founder Henry Ford transformed automobiles from an amusement for the wealthy to a conveyance for the common person, while in his workplaces he introduced mass production on an unprecedented scale. Ford fell behind General Motors in the 1920s and experienced decades of management instability. It rebounded in the 1980s and 1990s by promoting product quality and labor-management cooperation in its domestic operations, while taking over a series of prestigious foreign marques such as Jaguar and Range Rover (both later sold). Yet its image was seriously tarnished in a controversy that erupted in 2000 over the safety of its sport-utility vehicles. After the founder’s great-grandson took over as chairman in 1999, he made unprecedented overtures to environmentalists but was then unable to live up to his green promises. Ford, which diverged from GM and Chrysler by deciding not to seek a U.S. government bailout, is belatedly putting more emphasis on fuel-efficient vehicles, and is trying to survive the economic crisis afflicting the entire auto industry.

Profile editor: 
Phil Mattera
Ownership status: 
Publicly traded
Number of employees worldwide: 
213,000
Chief executive officer: 
Alan Mulally
Tel: 
(313) 322-3000
Net Income: 
-$14.7 billion (loss)
Total revenue: 
$146.3 billion
Corporate accountability
Accountability overview: 

Over the years, Ford has exhibited a wide range of behavior with regard to corporate accountability. On the labor front, the company initially promoted a form of repressive paternalism, then fought unionization in the United States, and later made peace with the United Auto Workers. Then, when economic conditions worsened, it did not hesitate to eliminate vast numbers of jobs. Like the other major automakers, Ford long resisted safety and environmental reforms and was involved in a number of scandals in both areas. Over the past decade, the company tried to change its environmental profile, but it let market setbacks get in the way.

Labor: 

Henry Ford gained fame as the man who instituted the Five Dollar Day plan for his workers in the 1910s. The facts were somewhat more complicated: Not all workers qualified for that amount, which in any event was not the base pay. A large part of the $5 consisted of a "profit-sharing" bonus that had to be earned--on the job, workers had to maintain a high level of intensity, and off the job, they had to conform to a lifestyle that Ford considered appropriate.

To enforce the lifestyle regulations, Ford created a Sociological Department with inspectors who visited workers' homes, and interviewed family members and neighbors. The company wanted to be sure that workers were not spending their share of Ford profits in a frivolous or irresponsible manner.

Ford also became famous for the diversity of the workers he hired. Critics have pointed out that the varied nationalities and languages made union organizing more difficult, yet at the same time Ford pioneered the hiring of ex-convicts, people with disabilities, and blacks in industrial jobs.

The benign image of the Ford Motor began to dissolve during the Depression. In 1932 a protest march to the company's Rouge plant was met with tear gas and machine-gun fire that killed four people. Dearborn police officers were supplemented by members of the Service Department, Ford's own security force. Headed by Harry Bennett, the Service Department became notorious for its surveillance of workers both on and off the job.

Over the next few years, labor relations in the automobile industry were transformed. A wave of job actions in the industry paved the way for the creation of the United Automobile Workers of America in 1935 as an affiliate of the American Federation of Labor. The commitment of the UAW's activists to industrial unionism clashed with the craft-orientation and general conservatism of the AFL. In 1936 the UAW joined the newly established Committee for Industrial Organization, and set out to organize the big automakers.

General Motors was the first target. Short strikes at various sites around the country were followed by a nationwide action against the company in January 1937. The UAW successfully employed the tactic of sit-down strikes and plant occupations, most notably at the Fisher Body plant in Flint, Michigan. GM capitulated in February 1937, and Chrysler followed suit later in the year.

Things were more difficult at Ford. The organizing effort was curtailed after the infamous 1937 "Battle of the Overpass," in which Bennett's security force and freelance thugs attacked UAW organizers who attempted to distribute leaflets outside the Rouge plant. Although the company had clearly violated the National Labor Relations Act, Bennett bought time by co-opting some UAW leaders and exploiting divisions within the union (which included the creation of a new UAW allied with the AFL). In 1941, shortly after the charges against Ford were finally upheld by the Supreme Court, a wildcat strike spread through the company's plants. Henry Ford, reportedly under pressure from his son Edsel, finally relented and agreed to a representation election. The CIO-affiliated union won the vote overwhelmingly.

Once the presence of the union was an established fact, Bennett took an entirely different approach toward the UAW. Apparently seeking to co-opt the union, he negotiated an extremely generous contract, agreeing to a closed shop, dues checkoff, and a provision that Ford would match the highest wage rate paid by anyone in the industry.

Labor unrest escalated again after the Second World War. Yet while GM suffered a 113-day strike over wage increases, Ford settled with the UAW without an interruption of work. In the following years, the UAW won steady improvements for its members, including pioneering provisions such as supplementary unemployment benefits and company-paid pensions. The union's cooperative relationship with management averted strikes, but it heightened tension between rank and file workers and the UAW leadership. The result was periodic insurgencies on the shop floor, especially when a new generation of workers entered the factories in the late 1960s.

The ability of the UAW to win steady contract improvements came to an end with the auto industry crisis in the late 1970s. In 1979 the union agreed to $243 million in concessions to ailing Chrysler, and the federal government insisted on another $200 million as one term for the government bailout of the company. By the early 1980s, with several hundred thousand autoworkers indefinitely out of work, the UAW felt it had to give in to concessions sought by Ford and GM as well. In some cases Ford was ruthless in its demands for givebacks. At a plant in Sheffield, Alabama, for instance, the company told workers in 1981 that it would shut the plant unless they took a 50 percent cut in pay and benefits, or else bought the money-losing operation.

Some of this lost ground was regained when the industry rebounded in 1983. Still, a tug-of-war remained between company claims that the labor-cost differential with Japan had to be narrowed, and worker resistance to erosion in their standard of living. The leadership of the UAW, dealt with the problem by promoting a more cooperative relationship with management while seeking to expand job security and worker participation. The union also agreed to take part of a wage increase in the form of bonuses tied to the company's profit level.

The UAW continued to cooperate with Ford management in easing work rules and raising productivity, in exchange for modest improvements in job security. The union's strategy of using "jointness" as a way of trying to save jobs was also applied at joint manufacturing operations set up by Japanese companies and the Big Three in the United States, including the Ford-Mazda plant in Michigan. The contract at that facility went particularly far in allowing flexibility, thereby giving management the right to make broad use of temporary workers.

In 1996 the UAW reached a new agreement with Ford that guaranteed a minimum number of jobs and provided incentives—in the form of lower wages—if the company began producing more parts that were previously purchased from outside suppliers. The union also got Ford to indirectly assist the UAW’s efforts against supplier companies by refusing to accept parts produced by replacement workers during strikes. After Ford announced plans in 1999 to spin off its parts operation into a new company called Visteon, it negotiated a deal with the UAW that guaranteed that affected workers would maintain the same wages and benefits as the workforce remaining at Ford.

In a move that echoed the paternalism of its early years, Ford announced in 2000 that it would provide every one of its 350,000 employees worldwide a personal computer and unlimited internet access for their homes at a cost of $5 a month. The aim was to promote computer literacy among both the workers and their families.

Despite the spirit of cooperation, Ford announced major cuts in its North American workforce in 2002 and 2006. The company further angered UAW members by announcing that a new assembly plant would be built in Mexico. In September 2006 the company offered buyouts to all of its 75,000 hourly workers in the United States. Almost half accepted the offer.

Faced with a shrinking company and mounting losses, the UAW agreed to additional job reductions in 2007. And in 2009 the union helped the company by allowing it to pay off up to half of its $13 billion obligation to retirees in stock rather than cash.

Virtually all of the company’s hourly employees around the world are members of, or represented by, labor unions. Ford has had a mixed labor relations record outside the United States. For many years a hot spot was Britain, the site of major strikes in 1978 and 1988. In the latter case more than 30,000 British Ford workers went on strike to resist company demands for additional workplace reorganization. Company demands went beyond what the unions had consented to in 1985--which Ford had said were necessary to compete with the Japanese car makers that were entering the British market. Other strikes occurred in 1990 and 1999, but labor-management relations quieted down in the 2000s.

In 1985 the first worldwide conference of rank and file Ford workers took place in Liverpool, England. Representatives came not only from plants in Europe--which had previously held such meetings--but also from Brazil, Malaysia, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and North America. Subsequent gatherings of Ford workers from different parts of the world were held under the auspices of the International Metalworkers' Federation and the Transnational Information Exchange.

There has been labor unrest in recent years at Ford’s production operations in Russia, including slowdowns in 2005 and a strike in 2007.

Employment Discrimination:

In September 1999 Ford reached a $17.5 million settlement with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to resolve charges of racial and sexual harassment brought by female workers at two of the company’s plants. The company paid $7.5 million in damages to the women and agreed to spend $10 million to train its employees throughout the country on preventing discrimination and harassment.

In 2005 a lawsuit was filed against Ford Motor Credit, a division of Ford Motor, charging that the company allowed auto dealers to discriminate against minorities in setting interest rates on loan agreements provided through its Primus Automotive Financial Services unit. The following year Primus agreed to pay more than $2 million to settle the suit but did not admit any wrongdoing.

Environment and product safety: 

SAFETY. Ford's reputation as an automaker was seriously blemished in the 1970s, when its new compact Pinto turned out to have a fatal flaw: Its fuel tank was unshielded and located near the back bumper in the fragile car, meaning that rear-end collisions frequently resulted in horrific explosions. Evidence later emerged that Ford was aware of the vulnerability of the gas tank, but went ahead with production of the car. In one civil case a jury awarded $125 million in damages (reduced by the judge to $3.5 million), but in another Pinto case, company executives were found innocent of murder charges. (For more details, see chapter 30 of Russell Mokhiber’s 1988 book Corporate Crime and Violence.)

Ford was also embarrassed by reports that many of its cars with automatic transmissions produced during the 1970s had a tendency to slip from park into reverse. In 1981 federal regulators forced the company to send warning notices to purchasers of some 23 million vehicles about the problem. Ford may not have been happy about this, but it was a lot less onerous than the massive recall of the cars that had been urged by public interest groups.

In 1996 Ford gave in to public pressure and agreed to pay for replacing ignition switches on more than 8 million cars and trucks that were prone to short circuits that could cause fires. In 1998 State Farm, the largest auto insurer in the United States, sued Ford, charging that the company withheld information about the potential fire hazard from federal regulators and the public. State Farm, which sought to recover monies it paid out in claims relating to the faulty switches, also said that Ford’s 1996 recall did not cover enough vehicles. The insurer released nearly 200 pages of internal documents to back up its claim.

In 1999 the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration hit Ford with a $425,000 fine in the matter. An investigation later revealed evidence that Ford knew about ignition defects, which also sometimes caused vehicles to stall out while making turns, but remained silent. A California judge then ordered the recall of an additional two million vehicles—the first time a U.S. court had ever taken such an action against automaker.

In August 2000 Bridgestone/Firestone announced a massive recall of tires, most of which had been installed on Ford sport-utility vehicles and light trucks. Ford alleged that the tire company had known of the defects for several years. Information later came out suggesting that Ford, as well as Bridgestone/Firestone, had known of the tire defects long before the recalls were announced.

A December 2000 investigation by the New York Times found that in the 1980s Ford had taken a number of design shortcuts that raised the risk of rollover accidents in what would become its wildly popular Explorer SUV.

Ford and Bridgestone/Firestone continued pointing fingers at one another. In May 2001 the tire maker said it would stop selling tires to Ford, accusing it of using the tire issue to divert attention from the safety of its SUVs. Later, the tire maker called on the U.S. Transportation Department to open a safety investigation of the Ford Explorer and its tendency to experience rollover crashes when a tire failed. In June 2001 the feud between the two companies was displayed as chief executives of the two companies attacked each other during a congressional hearing.

ENVIRONMENT. For more than three decades, Ford has been embroiled in controversies over the environmental impact of its vehicles, and it long resisted higher federal standards for fuel economy. In 1973 the company was fined $7 million for falsifying tests results submitted to the federal government on emissions testing. In 1991 more than 60,000 Ford pickup trucks and vans were recalled for emissions that exceeded federal standards. The following year more than 1.2 million Ford vehicles were recalled for similar reasons.

In 1998 Ford was fined $2.5 million for a pollution-control problem on 60,000 of its 1997 Econoline vans, plus another $3.8 million in other costs and compensatory measures.

After William Clay Ford Jr. took over as chairman in 1999, he tried to improve the company’s image on environmental matters. Ford was the exclusive sponsor of Time magazine’s special Earth Day edition in 2000, and it sponsored a concert in San Francisco to honor the “heroes for the planet” featured in the magazine. In May 2000 the company issued its first corporate citizenship report, which included an admission that the SUVs on which it was so dependent caused serious environmental problems.

While Ford made overtures to environmentalists behind the scenes, the company did not take any steps to end its production of SUVs. It was also embarrassing to the company that its fleet failed to meet federal fuel-economy standards. Yet in July 2000 Ford vowed to increase the average fuel economy of its SUVs by 25 percent over the following five years. Later the company also broke with its Detroit rivals and supported a plan to use federal tax credits to jump-start demand for hybrid vehicles.

Environmentalists grew disillusioned with Ford as the company, citing the difficult market climate, was slow to make significant fuel-economy improvements. In August 2002 Ford abandoned its electric-car project, and the following year it backed away from its pledge to boost the fuel economy of its SUVs. Bluewater Network launched an ad campaign depicting the chairman of Ford as Pinocchio, prompting the company to threaten legal action against the environmental group.

Ford revived its emphasis on fuel economy in late 2008 amid the growing crisis of the industry and pressure from the federal government for structural changes. Ford introduced the Fusion, its most aggressive effort to compete in the hybrid market with Toyota’s Prius.

For years, Ford has been embroiled in a controversy over the toxic dumping that occurred at its Mahwah plant in New Jersey, which closed in 1980. By 2004 local residents had grown frustrated over botched remediation efforts at the Superfund site. A 2007 article in the New York Times said the situation deteriorated into “what environmental experts say is now among the messiest industrial cleanup efforts in Superfund’s 27-year history.”

Human rights: 

It was long known that Henry Ford was “soft” on fascism during the 1930s, but since the late 1990s there have been allegations that he and Ford Motor had close ties with Nazi Germany. In 1998 a lawsuit was filed in U.S. federal court alleging that a German subsidiary of Ford made use of forced labor during the 1940s. A November 30, 1998 article in the Washington Post provided details of historical research charging that both Ford and General Motors collaborated extensively with the Nazi regime. Additional documentation appeared in a January 24, 2000 article by Ken Silverstein in The Nation.

Over the past decade there have also been allegations that the management of Ford Motor’s operation in Argentina were involved in the abduction and disappearance of union activists during the “dirty war” against dissidents conducted by the military dictatorship that ruled the country from 1976 to 1983. In 2002 a federal prosecutor in Argentina filed a criminal complaint against the company. In 2006 former union organizers brought a civil suit against Ford.

Ford is one of the defendants in a lawsuit seeking damages from companies that did business in South Africa during the apartheid era.

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History

The story of Ford Motor begins, of course, with the life of Henry Ford. Born in 1863 on a farm in rural Michigan, he had an aptitude for things mechanical. In the 1890s, while working as an engineer for the Edison Illuminating Co. in Detroit, he tinkered first with a small internal combustion engine, and then with a vehicle propelled by such a device. In 1896 he completed his first version of a horseless carriage--an invention that was then only a decade old.

The crude product, which Ford called a Quadricycle, was a stepping stone to a more refined vehicle completed in 1898. The following year he left his job at Edison and formed the Detroit Automobile Company, the city's first car maker. The venture survived only about a year, however, being forced to dissolve when Ford's backers declined to invest any more in the money-losing operation.

Ford rebounded after driving one of his creations in a car race in Grosse Point in 1901 and winning an upset victory. The achievement encouraged his backers to set up Ford in a new company. Yet after Ford showed himself to be more interested in a new racing car he was designing than the vehicle the company was planning to sell, the investors gave him the boot. After Ford's departure, they adopted the name Cadillac Automobile Co., which would later become the luxury car division of General Motors.

For a while Ford continued to pursue his racing car ambitions, but in 1902 he and a new partner, Alex Malcolmson, joined the hundreds of entrepreneurs seeking fortune in the production of passenger cars. The following year the venture, now known as Ford Motor Company, began producing (with the help of various subcontractors) an automobile designated the Model A.

The car was well received, and the company soon reached an output of 25 vehicles a day. In 1904 three new products--the Model B, the Model C, and the Model F--were announced. With a price range from $800 to $2,000, they appealed to customers with varying means. Malcolmson believed that making more expensive cars would be more profitable, so he pushed Ford to go further upscale with the Model K, a luxurious touring car with a six-cylinder engine.

Ford, however, was beginning to develop the strategy that would make him famous. He pushed the idea of making an inexpensive car that would be affordable to a much wider portion of the population. Introduced in 1908, the Model T was not only relatively cheap at $825; its appeal was also based on its innovative transmission, its novel ignition system (which did away with the need for dry-storage batteries), and its use of components made of lightweight but sturdy vanadium.

The Model T revolutionized daily life, first in the United States and then in many other parts of the world. Automobiles were transformed from a novelty for the rich into the basis for mass mobility. The change was most dramatic in rural areas, where the car--which was especially well suited to bumpy country roads --made farm life much less isolated. By the end of the First World War, nearly half of all the cars in the world were "Tin Lizzies," as the Model T came to be called. Eventually some 15 million of them would be sold.

The Model T was also significant because of how it was made. Ford applied the time and motion techniques of Frederick Taylor to his factories, and in 1913 he introduced the first moving assembly line. Ford also shook up the industry by raising the wages of his workers, a step that was taken to reduce labor turnover. In addition, Ford kept lowering the price of the Model T and even gave rebates to customers when sales rose above a certain level.

During the First World War, Henry Ford spent a large amount of money subsidizing an independent peace initiative, but he also won a contract from the U.S. Navy to produce Eagle boats designed to fight German submarines. After the war, Ford, who bought out his fellow shareholders in 1919, stepped up production of tractors, and in the mid-1920s he started producing airplanes. Yet he resisted updating the Model T, which had come to look drab and old-fashioned next to the flashier cars being produced by General Motors and other companies. After much anguish--including pressure from his son Edsel, who had been given the title of president in 1918--Ford relented, and in 1927 the Model T production line was shut down.

That same year the company introduced, with great fanfare, a new Model A, which incorporated many of the advanced in automobiles that had emerged since the birth of the Model T two decades earlier. Yet the retooling required for the new car was far behind schedule, so that production fell well below demand. Other companies filled the void, and Ford Motor lost its first place position in the industry to General Motors. The company faced further travails during the Depression, but used price cuts to raise demand. By this time Ford was also producing in Canada, Britain, Germany, and a dozen other countries; there was even a licensing arrangement with the Soviet Union.

Although Henry Ford was soft on Nazism--he accepted an award from the German government in 1938—he was quick to offer the services of Ford Motor when the U.S. government began its military mobilization two years later. He built a huge plant called Willow Run to produce B-24 Liberator bombers. The facility, initially hyped as a veritable Eighth Wonder of the World, turned instead into a national embarrassment because of production problems. Edsel Ford, then trying to exercise real control in the company as his aging father grew increasingly out of touch with reality, had his own personal problems. Edsel's health steadily deteriorated, and he died of cancer in 1943. Henry Ford wanted to name Harry Bennett, his right-hand man, as Edsel's successor as president, but the family would not hear of it. To resolve the immediate problem, Henry Ford himself took over the position, but that was obviously not a permanent solution. The founder's grandson, Henry Ford II, was released from the Navy and brought back to Detroit. The young Ford had to deal with hostility from Bennett and sometimes even from his own grandfather, but finally in 1945 he was given the presidency of the company. Henry Ford I died two years later.

The automaker that Henry Ford II took over was a troubled company. The introduction of upscale Lincoln cars and the middle-range Mercury models had not prevented Ford from falling further behind both the Chevrolet division of General Motors and Chrysler. Ford was no genius, but he realized he needed help. Only a few weeks after he took over the presidency an offer of such assistance came from an unusual source: a group of ten young men who had gained recognition during the war for their skills in the Office of Statistical Control, which played an invaluable service in planning large-scale movements of supplies. As the war ended, the group, headed by Charles "Tex" Thornton--at 32 a colonel in the Army Air Force, decided to stay together and hire themselves out to a corporation. After learning of what was happening in Dearborn, they decided Ford was that corporation.

It turned out that Henry Ford II agreed. The group, which also included future Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Arjay Miller, began work at the company in early 1946. Before long they were known collectively as the "Whiz Kids." The group adopted a take-charge attitude, but Ford brought in Ernest Breech, a financial expert who had worked for GM, to oversee their work. It was Breech who pushed the company to develop an entirely new car--the 1949 Ford--which had a sleek, aerodynamic design and was the first passenger car to have an overdrive option. The success of the new car caused Breech's stock to soar and thus prompted the ambitious Tex Thornton to depart for Hughes Aircraft. He later founded the conglomerate Litton Industries.

Between the efforts of Breech and those of the remaining Whiz Kids, Ford enjoyed a dramatic comeback in the early 1950s. Yet the bulk of the company's sales remained with less expensive cars, which threw off a lot less profit than the pricier models. So the decision was made to develop a new medium-priced car. Actually, the car was not entirely new, but Ford's public relations people cooked up the image of something that had been a decade in the making. Although thousands of names had been considered, the final choice was Edsel.

The ill-fated Edsel arrived in September 1957, in the middle of a recession and amid a turn in the market toward less expensive cars. The much-ballyhooed product was a flop. The only consolation for the company—which went public for the first time in 1956—was that a significant number of people who passed up the Edsel purchased Ford's new Fairlane, a less expensive car introduced during the same period. A few years later Ford, like GM, reluctantly responded to the rising demand for compact cars with the introduction of the Falcon. And when GM scored with its upscale small car, the Monza, Ford responded in 1964 with the Mustang.

The sporty car was a great success, and the man who took much of the credit was Lee Iacocca, an aggressive salesman who had been promoted to the head of the Ford Division in 1960. Iacocca, who intended to rise much further in the company, was incensed when, in 1968, Henry Ford hired as president a high-ranking GM defector, Semon Knudsen. Knudsen lasted only a year amid the ruthless corporate politics of the company. Fifteen months later Iacocca was a large step closer to his ultimate ambition--ruler of the Ford empire--when he was named president of the company. Yet Iacocca was not to have his final triumph. Henry Ford grew to dislike the man, and in 1978 forced him out. A year later Ford, tired of fighting off shareholder lawsuits charging financial improprieties, stepped down and handed over the reins to Philip Caldwell.

Caldwell had his hands full. As a result of the highly publicized problems of the Pinto, the quality of the company's cars had come into question. Ford, like the other two big car companies, was caught off guard by the soaring demand for small, fuel-efficient cars brought on by the oil crisis. Yet GM had moved quickly to bring out its compact X-cars while Ford struggled to find a replacement for the Pinto.

For some time the true dimensions of the company's problems in the United States were concealed by profits from abroad. It was during the 1970s, in fact, that Ford made great strides toward internationalizing its operations. The first step was to standardize designs internationally so that what was essentially the same car could be marketed around the world. The leading example of this was Ford's Fiesta, introduced in 1976.

The next stage involved producing what came to be called the global car. Plants in a variety of countries were used to produce components that were brought together in several centralized assembly facilities. Ford began assembling its Escort in three countries with components manufactured by Ford factories in nine nations. This technique, "global sourcing," allowed Ford to take advantage of maximum economies of scale in the component plants, and also made it less vulnerable to strikes or other disruptions in any one country. In 1979 the company also took a 25 percent stake in Japanese automaker Toyo Kogyo (later known as Mazda), which began producing components and later engineered whole cars for Ford.

By the early 1980s Ford's deteriorating conditions in Europe meant that the company's foreign exploits were no longer making up for its domestic travails. Ford experienced three years of heavy losses, yet those abysmal conditions did not last for long. A turnaround began in 1983 (helped in part by union concessions), and by the middle of the decade Ford was rapidly gaining market share thanks to the popularity of its new European-looking Taurus and Mercury Sable models. In 1986 Ford had a larger net income than GM for the first time since 1924. The company felt confident enough to pay a hefty $2.5 billion to acquire Britain's luxury carmaker Jaguar in 1989.

The good times were not permanent. By 1990 the company's money-making machine was sputtering as the Japanese onslaught continued and Ford was slow in updating its product line. The plunge was especially dramatic in Ford's European operations.

The company sought to rebound with the 1993 introduction of a “world car”— called the Contour in North America and the Mondeo elsewhere—that could be built and sold in largely the same way around the globe. The company also redesigned its popular Taurus. In 1996 Ford increased its stake in Mazda high enough to have a controlling interest, and reached a contract with the UAW that traded job security for cost reductions and productivity gains. At the same time, the company made a big push into then-popular (and highly profitable) sport-utility vehicles and light trucks. In June 1998 Fortune celebrated the company’s prosperity with an article headlined THE GENTLEMEN AT FORD ARE KICKING BUTT.

Chief among those gentlemen was Alex Trotman, who soon retired and was replaced as chairman by William Clay Ford Jr., great-grandson of the company’s founder, while the CEO post went to Jacques Nasser, the aggressive head of Ford’s automotive division.

In 1999 Ford acquired the automotive business of Sweden’s Volvo, and thereby gained a total market share in Europe greater than that of General Motors. The following year it spun off its parts-making operation into a new company called Visteon Automotive Systems, and acquired the Land Rover line of SUVs from BMW.

Ford suffered a setback in 2000 when many of its SUVs were affected by a massive recall of tires produced by Bridgestone/Firestone. This came when the business press was reporting that morale inside the company was plummeting because of the radical organizational changes Nasser promoted. In October 2001 Nasser was ousted, and Chairman Ford took complete control of the company. Several months later, he announced the most sweeping cutbacks in two decades, eliminating 35,000 jobs, closing five plants, and dropping four models, including the famous Lincoln Continental luxury car.

To reverse several years of heavy losses, Ford emphasized profitability over volume, and he spun off the Hertz rental-car unit. He continued downsizing the company with a January 2006 announcement that an additional 14 plants and 34,000 jobs would be eliminated in North America. Later that year Ford gave up his post as CEO—which went to Alan Mulally, a Boeing executive—while remaining as chairman. Mulally continued the cutbacks, but the company faced mounting losses—a record $12.7 billion in 2006.

Seeking to profit from an emerging turnaround, veteran corporate raider Kirk Kerkorian bought a stake of about 6 percent in Ford in 2008. Kerkorian, who had previously taken positions in General Motors and Chrysler, admitted that the Ford family’s holdings made a takeover impossible, and said his aim was to help the company restructure. Yet as Ford and the rest of the industry continued to slump amid the recession, Kerkorian sold off his holdings after six months, taking a loss of about $700 million.

Kerkorian may have bailed too soon. Ford seemed to benefit from the worse condition of GM and Chrysler. Despite losing more than $14 billion in 2008, it felt strong enough to pass up the federal loans sought by its Detroit rivals, and instead eliminated some $10 billion in debt by paying off creditors, or getting them to convert their holdings into equity. Ford also sold Jaguar and Range Rover to India’s Tata Group, and reduced its holding in Mazda to 13 percent, ceding control of the Japanese automaker.

In March 2010 Ford agreed to sell Volvo to the Chinese automaker Zhejiang Geely Holding Group. In June 2010 the company announced that it would discontinue its Mercury models.

Financial information
Stock ticker symbol: 
F
Fiscal year: 
2008
Fiscal year: 
2008
Major lines of business/segments: 

Automotive (88 percent of 2008 revenue). Ford’s automotive business is divided into Ford North America (Ford, Lincoln and Mercury vehicles; 42 plants at the end of 2008), Ford South America (7 plants), Ford Europe (19 plants), Volvo (9 plants) and Ford Asia Pacific Africa (12 plants).

Financial Services (12 percent of 2008 revenue). Retail and wholesale automotive financing through Ford Motor Credit.